

610 for State in 1961) was reinforced by the disposition of Foster Dulles to rely more on the judgments cast up by his brother's labyrinthine apparatus than on his own State Department expertise.

It is one thing to say that the CIA proved incompetent but quite another to suggest that Cuba uncovered a state of dangerous disarray in our whole process of foreign policy planning. If it were thought that the President need only tighten up CIA operations, then a few firings and some tinkering with the structure—such as transferring operational responsibility for para-military activities to another jurisdiction—would suffice.

But if the President's problem is how intelligence should fit into a new scheme of policy formulation, then the need for more fundamental reorganization becomes plainer.

It is not yet clear how the Kennedy Administration sees the problem. Some in CIA have talked privately to newsmen about plans of the Agency to move into its new quarters in September—as if to say that nothing much will change. And nothing of consequence has by all accounts changed since Cuba inside the CIA.

One learns of an anti-Castro Cuban who got a phone call two weeks ago from the CIA. He was given a message by a secretary from "Mr. Bender"—the agent who had been in charge of the landing and a man widely known to be anathema to the Cuban in question—only to get another call an hour later informing him that the mes-

sage had really come from Mr. So and So, and that "Mr. Bender" no longer had anything to do with Cuban matters!! Where, one wonders, is "Mr. Bender" now?

The President and his advisers may be in no hurry to dismantle the intelligence operation we have until it is clear what should take its place, after which new appointments can sensibly be made. One encouraging sign is that the much-publicized report submitted by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor on the narrow issue of relocating paramilitary operations outside of CIA is not to be the last word.

More Sweeping Proposals

More sweeping recommendations are to come from the Killian Committee, which has been meeting quietly with an eye to a July 1 deadline. It should be noted, however, that this is a citizens' group which has been able to get together at most once a week, which has no staff to speak of, and which has somewhat imprecisely defined terms of reference. Though its members are all estimable men, many of them are carry-overs from a precursor committee, established by President Eisenhower, which looked on without sounding any very noisy alarm at what was happening over the years in CIA.

In a certain sense, these men are now being asked to investigate their own past performance. One trusts that the President will supplement their recommendations with some independent-minded staff work and with a much wider range of consultation in and out of government.